About Behaviorology

Behaviorology is an independently organized discipline featuring the natural science of behavior. Behaviorologists study the functional relations between behavior and its independent variables in the behavior–determining environment. Behaviorological accounts are based on the behavioral capacity of the species, the personal history of the behaving organism, and the current physical and social environment in which behavior occurs. Behaviorologists discover the natural laws governing behavior. They then develop beneficial behavior–engineering technologies applicable to behavior related concerns in all fields including child rearing, education, employment, entertainment, government, law, marketing, medicine, and self–management.

Behaviorology features strictly natural accounts for behavioral events. In this way behaviorology differs from disciplines that entertain fundamentally superstitious assumptions about humans and their behavior. Behaviorology excludes the mystical notion of a rather spontaneous origination of behavior by the willful action of ethereal, body–dwelling agents connoted by such terms as mind, psyche, self, muse, or even pronouns like I, me, and you.

Among behavior scientists who respect the philosophy of naturalism, two major strategies have emerged through which their respective proponents would have the natural science of behavior contribute to the culture. One strategy is to work in basic non–natural science units and demonstrate to the other members the kind of effective science that natural philosophy can inform. In contrast, behaviorologists are organizing an entirely independent discipline for the study of behavior that can take its place as one of the recognized basic natural sciences.
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Volume 12 Number 2
Contents Plan

Here are some of the featured items planned for the next issue (Fall 2009) of Behaviorology Today, although these plans may change:

» The Religious Psychology Student in a Behaviorology Course (Lawrence E. Fraley)
» 10 Steps to Self-Esteem (Glenn I. Latham)
» An article or two from among those that may be in process from various guest authors. When will your article arrive? (Staff writers can maintain the publication schedule with worthy contributions, but worthy articles from guest authors make even more valuable disciplinary literature contributions.)—Ed.

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Note: This issue does not contain any TIBI online course syllabus. In some future issues, new syllabi or updates of previous syllabi will appear. (See the Syllabus Directory near the back of each issue.)—Ed.

As part of the organizational structure of the independent natural science of behavior, The International Behaviorology Institute (TIBI), a non-profit professional organization, exists to focus behaviorological philosophy and science on a broad range of cultural problems. TIBI sponsors an association (the TIBI Association, or TIBIA) for interested people to join, supporting the mission of TIBI and participating in its activities. And Behaviorology Today is the magazine/newsletter of the Institute. The guest and staff writers of Behaviorology Today provide at least minimally peer-reviewed articles as well as, on occasion and with explicit designation, fully peer-reviewed articles. They write on the full range of disciplinary topics including historical, philosophical, conceptual, educational, experimental, and technological (applied) considerations. Please join us—if you have not already done so—and support bringing the benefits of behaviorology to humanity. (Contributions to TIBI or TIBIA are tax-deductible.)


**Natural Science, Superstition, & Academic Institutions**  
**Part II (of II)**

Lawrence E. Fraley

West Virginia University

[This is part 2 of another topical excerpt from “Person, Life, and Culture,” a later chapter of the author’s book, *General Behaviorology: The Natural Science of Human Behavior* (Fraley, 2008). Given its relevance to improvements in cultural concerns, readers of this journal may find it pertinent. The first part was presented in the Fall 2008 issue (Volume 11, Number 2).—Ed.]

Today, few people yearn for a return to what are regarded as the “dark ages” of premedicine or to the preindustrial era when people had to toil in drudgery merely to survive—their lives typically short and many hardly worth living as judged by modern standards. We owe our rescue from that plight to the implications of our cultural investment in physics, chemistry, and biology—basic disciplines that have informed the work in the various applied fields that have provided improvements to the human condition.

**Superstition and Natural Science with Respect to Cultural Development**

Current reviews of life in earlier times often feature a romantic focus on the small fraction of individuals who in one way or another exploited the economic and social predicament of others to attain even a meager approximation of the life enjoyed by most people in contemporary culture. A small class of exalted individuals kept the majority’s minimal subsistence contingent on its collective support of a relatively more comfortable life style for those privileged few. However, by present standards, such privileged individuals tended not only to be ignorant, dirty, and stinky, but typically died relatively young, often after suffering horrendous trauma or disease from which they could be rescued neither by the labors of their underlings, the sympathetic efforts of their exalted peers, the ministration of contemporary healers, nor superstitious appeals to what they assumed to be their supernatural overseers.

However, that dark age continues with respect to human behavior, a domain of phenomena that most people still approach with arbitrary practices informed by superstition. The adverse implications of such practices abound and seem to worsen as the human population expands and technology shrinks the planet. Yet those superstitious practices are defended and promoted by the many who in various ways have invested heavily in them. Such advocacy is especially vigorous by those whose personal economic and social well being depends on the implications of widespread recourse to the particular themes of superstition that they promote.

We celebrate the cultural advances of our times in part by reviewing how people eventually overcame resistance to advances in human well being that were being mounted by the forces of organized ignorance and superstition. We retrospectively deplore the resistance that impeded the cultural progress that was becoming possible through applied physics, chemistry, and biology—resistance that was sometimes deliberate and sometimes inadvertent. Today it is fashionable to lament the tragedy of the multitudes that could have lived better and longer lives had the forces of organized ignorance and superstition been overcome sooner.

Yet even now, a vast superstitious majority continues to proselytize and to teach that the implications of its popular superstitious analyses of human behavior constitute the righteous fate of mankind. In cases where those implications are aversive or seemingly illogical, they are nevertheless to be accepted and endured faithfully. As always, the quality of life may be diminished in various ways for those who are affected insofar as they may experience (a) contact with fewer kinds of positive reinforcers (life is less broadly enriched), (b) a lower density of contacts with positive reinforcers of whatever limited kinds remain allowed (life is less joyful), and (c) prolonged contact with aversive stimuli (life can be harsh). If such a degradation in the quality of life pertains not to one’s own life but to another person’s life, the prevalent conditioning generally tends to prepare one to disregard rational tendencies toward compassion and to hew instead to whatever current interpretations of the superstitious ideology may be resulting in that person’s plight.

Typically, those who have organized effectively to promote the more popular forms of behavior-related superstition have conditioned their followers to experience reinforcing emotional reactions when behaving accordingly. That is, people have been conditioned to feel good when they exhibit those kinds of superstitiously informed behavior. In accordance with the accompanying instruction, the affected people then tend to misinterpret those good feelings as an indication that whatever superstitious behavior elicits those positive emotional reactions is intrinsically meritorious.

However, any person can be conditioned to experience any specified kind of emotional reaction to any given kind of event, so people can be conditioned to feel just as warm and fulfilled upon behaving objectively as
most now feel upon behaving superstitiously. The emotional conditioning that now supports indulgence in currently popular cultural superstition could have been made to pertain instead to behavioral repertoires that would comport with a philosophy of naturalism. General ignorance about the respondent and operant aspects of emotional behavior has presented the purveyors of cultural superstition with a substantial promotional opportunity that they have tended to exploit extensively if only intuitively.

In most cases, people who exhibit an extensive superstitious repertoire have amassed a substantial personal investment in the implications of their superstitious assumptions and by now cannot afford the implications of a substantial overhaul of their behavior. Typically, they will also be burdened with the ignorance that is left in the wake of the inferior kind of education that superstitious assumptions typically misguide, which diminishes their capacity to profit from belated corrective measures. However, a strategy for cultural change that includes circumventing and ignoring superstitious people is feasible only if the behavior of strongly superstitious people can be tolerated through the remaining course of their lifetimes—behavior that may include aggressive countermeasures to prevent the expansion of objectivity within the general culture.

It is probably easier to create a predominantly superstitious–free culture by attrition than by conversion. Change that is based on attrition requires carefully avoiding the superstitious indoctrination of new persons while foregoing costly and often unproductive efforts to change the strongly conditioned superstitious behavior of people who have had a long involvement with it. But keeping new people free of superstitious indoctrination is difficult when they are being raised by superstitious parents.

However, that feat has long been approximated, at least to a limited degree, by requiring such children to undergo a public education during which they are brought under control of both scientific methods and objectively produced outcomes. This alludes to the fact that even in schools that serve a generally superstitious culture and which deliberately teach respect for various kinds of superstition, the natural science community is usually represented on a limited beachhead where the objectivity that naturalism fosters can be demonstrated to yield more efficacious results than does recourse to superstition. In some cases those presentations affect students in whom the indoctrination in superstition has as yet been superficial. Further substantial progress could be made if the general lesson about scientific efficacy were to pertain to behavioral phenomena to the same extent that it pertains to other classes of phenomena. In any case, one result of the natural science foothold within the schools has been that children, upon becoming adults, have tended to exhibit less behavior that is controlled in blatantly superstitious ways than did their parents.

Note, too, that the same cultural development strategy that is available to those who promote naturalism is also available to superstitious communities as a method of countercontrol. Within communities and cultural institutions that promote superstitious practices as a worthwhile way of coming to know, young people are typically shielded from opportunities for alternative conditioning while being indoctrinated in the prevailing superstitious philosophy. Such shielding may be accomplished in the schools by formally requiring presentations of science that are balanced between natural and superstitious interpretations, or in more extreme cases by hiring people to teach science who interpret natural phenomena according to the prevailing superstitious assumptions. In addition, just as the natural science community may sponsor private schools to preclude students’ being indoctrinated with superstition, a superstitious community may establish private schools to eliminate all vestiges of naturalism, and currently the latter far outnumber the former.

On a broader scale, in political democracies, which extend to each individual the right to vote, a superstitious majority can easily gain control of the government and then use the government’s broad spectrum of ways and means to protect and promote its superstitious ideology. Through the agency of government, the requirement of public displays of conformance to superstitious ideology can be appended to formally prescribed, and in some cases required, exhibits of citizenship.

In the various contests for intellectual predominance that characterize contemporary human culture, the natural science community, absent an organized natural science of behavior among its rank and file, is largely unprepared to muster and apply the most relevant of its potential disciplinary resources—namely, a natural science of human behavior. A natural science community is not only rendered more complete by the addition of behaviorology to its core of basic disciplines, it thereby equips itself with the precise science not only by which to analyze superstitious behavior per se but to replace it. As this book has made clear, a natural science of attitudes, values, rights, ethics, morals, and beliefs is not merely possible, its fundamentals have already been developed.

1 A familiar example in the United States of America is the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes a statement that the nation exists under the oversight of God. That inclusion was inserted by a government that acted in behalf of a religious majority, and most school children are routinely compelled to recite it daily after the legitimacy of that coercive practice was upheld by a judiciary consisting of Presidential appointees who were subsequently approved for service by a congressional majority.
founders of the Royal Society, the issues of scientific in-
tentions, control of their own literature, et cetera).

The natural science community has served human
culture well, but it is arguably time that it move beyond
the creation of better tools to include the creation of better
behavior. Behaviorology must become established as the
fourth basic discipline in the natural science neighbor-
hood if that community is to offer scientifically informed
practices that can substitute for the superstition–based
practices that continue to be promoted throughout
temporary contemporary culture. Of special importance in that reg-
ard are scientifically based practices for bringing other kinds and patterns of behavior under appropriate control.

Arguably, it is unlikely that any culture can endure
indefinitely or at least prosper optimally while relying on
superstitious interpretations to guide its sociocultural
affairs. With a natural science of behavior–environment
relations among its conceptual armamentarium, the
natural science community would be postured to replace
the superstitiously co–opted social sciences with which it
must now maintain an often uneasy cooperation. That
troublesome alliance has its potential costs. The sociocul-
tural implications of natural science products can be di-
minated, and in some cases the conduct of natural
science per se can be corrupted.

Like the phenomena in the other aspects of our envi-
ronment, nothing about sociocultural phenomena re-
quires an indulgence in superstitious thinking either for
accurate analyses and descriptions of function or for the
attainment of their advantageous control. The quality of
enduring mystery, no matter how awesome it may be
made to seem, is more indicative of disciplinary in-
adegacy than connotative of nature perturbed by super-
natural influences.

Historically, the natural science community has man-
aged its vast impact on the culture from a posture of rela-
tive isolation in the sense of the somewhat independent
organization of the natural science community within
the culture. From the founding of Great Britain’s Royal
Society in the 1640s, the natural science community has
continued to avoid the unpromising strategy of infiltrat-
ing superstitious communities in an attempt to dispel
long and well established recourse to superstition among
their members. Instead, the natural scientists have acted to
maintain the epistemological integrity of their com-
unity through organizational independence that con-
tinues to feature some measure of isolation within the
culture at large (e.g., separate academic departments for
training new scientists, exclusive professional organiza-
tions, control of their own literature, et cetera).

Even though churchmen were prominent among the
founders of the Royal Society, the issues of scientific in-
terest in those times often pertained to matters that could
withstand an objective investigation without apparent
challenge to organized religion. That is, the largely physi-
cal and biological phenomena on which the science of
those times was focused seemed to differ in generic ways
from the phenomena on which religion concentrated, so
the prevailing science seldom tended to challenge the
superstitious behavior with which churchmen approached
those aspects of nature upon which they concentrated.

In modern times, increasingly, the problems that
threaten human culture and require effective scientific
solutions are of a behavioral nature. This at a time when
the natural science community, for lack of a strong incor-
porated component focused on human behavior, remains
largely unprepared to respond to such problems. Absent
a well established natural science of human behavior, the
natural science community must simply deposit such
matters on the doorstep of the agencies of organized
superstition for resolution, and the outcomes are of the
kinds that superstition tends to inform.

At the same time, the natural science community has
continued to make available to the culture at large its
various conceptual and material products. These contrib-
utions have been of such great effectiveness that the
people who are expected to solve practical problems
within the culture have been rendered dependent upon
the products of the natural science community. Those
consumers of conceptual and material scientific products
have developed a vested interest in the prosperity and sci-
entific integrity of the natural science community from
which those products emanate. As a result, the natural
science community is now to some degree protected, in
many cases with reluctant necessity, by the direct con-
sumers and by at least some of the ultimate beneficiaries
of its intellectual and material products. Most such
protections inhere at the somewhat informal level of
policy and tradition.

Strategically, that same course of well tested and suc-
cessful historical progress by which the long established
natural sciences have acquired and maintained some
degree of integrity within the culture would seem also
appropriate for the development and support of a newer
natural science, the products of which pertain, not to
energy, matter, or structures that live, but to behavioral
phenomena. The communal insularity that permits natu-
ral science to develop within a superstitious ambient cul-
ture is achieved in two principal ways—first, through
independent professional organizations whose members
establish and maintain the prevailing standards for disciplinary membership, and second, through the organizational isolation of the natural science programs within contemporary academic institutions. Universities typically feature departments of physics, chemistry, and biology that may be clustered together in a larger unit that has a scientific identity. Also included may be departments of applied science (e.g., geology, meteorology, oceanography, etc.) that have gained a reputation for practice in accordance with the tenets of natural science.

That kind of organizational insularity within academic institutions is essential to the epistemological integrity of the natural science community. That organizational independence, especially within higher education, enables the epistemological integrity of naturalism to be maintained to a helpful and necessary extent. Absent the protective preservation of its underlying philosophy of scientific naturalism, which requires a measure of isolation from the heavily superstitious ambient culture, the natural sciences are much more vulnerable to the ravages of intruding superstition.  

The Status of Natural Science in Academic Institutions

Regardless of the importance of natural science to human culture, epistemological integrity is not the officially recognized criterion by which the isolation of the natural science units has been established within higher education institutions. The kind of insularity that characterizes a particular natural science department within a typical university is officially justified only on the basis of the kind of subject matter upon which its studies are focused. Any attempted official or institutional endorsement of epistemological purity would be subject to challenge as a contradiction of the Constitution of the United States of America and thus disallowed, at least in institutions that rely on government funding.

Theoretically, however, the neural behavior of thinking can be subjected to qualitative culling both according to the effectiveness of its implications and according to whether current evidence is interpreted according to objectively produced criteria. That is, thinking behavior can be selected for social reinforcement (i.e., regarded as valuable) not only if it shares in the control of effective outcomes but also, more intrinsically, if the interpretation of evidence is according to criteria that have been established objectively as opposed to having emerged superstitiously. We are intuitively responding differentially to those qualitative nuances when we categorically distinguish between effective thought and logical or orderly thought (insofar as a thought can prove effective, perhaps accidentally, even though it is not logical).

Note, however, that even logical thought, when it is partly informed by superstitious assumptions and is therefore incorrect, may result in ineffective practical outcomes upon sharing in their control. As is often observed, logical, orderly, and perhaps complex thought that is predicated on invalid assumptions can lead to major mistakes. On the basis of a person’s logical, orderly, and perhaps complex thought in general, that putatively agential person may be described as smart. But on the basis of the ineffective practical behavior that functionally follows a particular instance of such thought, that same person may be described as wrong. That discrepancy typically results when evidence is interpreted to comport with superstitious basic assumptions, no matter how logical that initially ill-informed subsequent interpretation may be.

The interpretation of evidence by a person alludes to the function of a largely verbal class of stimuli that shares, along with the environmental evidence (generally called the subject matter) in controlling that person’s reactions to that subject matter (i.e., to what has been encountered in the environment). That supplementary class of verbal stimuli is said to be that person’s philosophy. The intrinsic quality of its interpretive function is established by the nature of the origin of that philosophical class of verbal stimuli. Specifically, if its constituent assumptions have

3 For example, if one insists incorrectly, as an implication of superstitiously informed assumptions, that natural processes cannot produce ordered complexity beyond what is to be expected as an occasional accidental random outcome, then one may readily attribute natural complexity to a sufficiently powerful deity who is conceptually endowed with the necessary capacity for such creative feats and who must have been under contingencies to bother with such exercises. This may even characterize the thinking of persons who are popularly regarded as intellectual, scholarly, and learned. If they also happen to be in positions of educational leadership, they may then logically de-emphasize the natural sciences in the curricula of the schools and replace them with more extensive theological studies on the assumption that the complex wonders of nature can best be understood through a greater familiarity with the putative deity by whose creative exercise nature has manifested.
each emerged by induction from large numbers of relevant operant iterations (i.e., from the results of many trials) then the functioning by members of that class of assumptions (interpretations according to that philosophy) lends the quality of objectivity to the ongoing thinking.

However, the qualitative analysis of thought (as exemplified by the preceding paragraph) has not yet sufficiently emerged as a sufficiently common general concept within the culture to support the confident and consistent enforcement of quality controls based on the intrinsic epistemological quality of thought as reflected in its publicized descriptions. For example, although within contemporary culture there is some exertion of social control that maintains objective thinking rather directly, superstitious thinking is not necessarily subject to prima facie discount. Thought remains largely under indirect control by the acceptance or rejection of the outcomes that it shares in producing. That is, when some neural behaviors of the thinking kind are finally recognized on the basis of their outcomes to have represented a good or a bad idea, the original thinkers’ public descriptions of their further thoughts will tend to be subject to a socially imposed differential reinforcement that favors the further ideas of those whose previous thoughts were proven to have shared in the control of effective outcomes (i.e., whose previous thoughts subsequently proved to have been good ideas).

Thus, within the culture at large there tends to be few if any formal protections for natural science based on the intrinsic qualities of its definitive neural behavior (i.e., the philosophical verbal behavior that shares in the control of one’s reactions to the environmental phenomena that are under consideration—verbal stimuli that qualify—control those reactions such that they represent a natural science discipline). Credentialling programs operated internally by the natural science community may arguably represent a preliminary step in that direction insofar as a formal credentialling process tends to cull out individuals whose intellectual products seem not to have been controlled in that way. In general, however, people cannot be required legally to exhibit public evidence of having thought in a particular pattern or to affirm that their thinking occurs in a particular pattern.

Under limited circumstances, people may be compelled to witness demonstrations of the efficacy of intellectual products that are being produced under the kinds of controls that define a natural science discipline. Examples may occur when university students are required to take a natural science course as part of their general education before being allowed to concentrate on a specialization. The students in such a course may not be graded in that course according to evidence that their own thinking in general features naturalistic assumptions, but their grades can be based on their descriptions of that epistemological framework (i.e., they can be compelled to describe it, but not to behave in that way in general). However, as a further training step, those students may be guided through the analysis of some phenomenon in a narrowed training context that has been contrived to ensure that their thinking probably remains objective during that exercise. The activity is kept within the national constitutional purview by treating it explicitly as the form of pretense known as practice (i.e., the students can be required to pretend that they are objective scientists in order to experience a sample of that kind of objective analytical activity). Those students cannot be penalized if the objective aspects of their behavior do not generalize to situations beyond that training exercise.

The issue of a person’s right to any style of thought becomes more muddled when a candidate is being considered for acceptance into a natural science training program or to fill a vacancy on the program faculty. Within publicly supported institutions of higher education, the academic units are officially distinguished only on the basis of subject matter. To the extent that a physics, chemistry, or biology department faculty reflects the epistemological perspective of scientific naturalism, it does so only for two main reasons. First, a majority of the faculty members operate professionally from that personal perspective and probably are hired initially because they seem to do so. Second, external professional organizations, having acquired certain credentialling or accreditation privileges, may be exercising some degree of oversight that requires public evidence of a natural science approach to the subject matter by science department faculty members. That imposes an indirect mechanism of selection that tends to ensure that a professionally certified person will behave an appropriately naturalistic quality—controlling philosophy with respect to whatever phenomenon is under professional scrutiny in that person’s academic department.

The allowance for a departmental faculty to hire new members on the basis of evidence of a candidate’s personal epistemological practices without having to account to outsiders for doing so represents a practical compromise with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Within academic institutions, that compromise is deemed necessary to assemble a group of faculty members that can endow a natural science department with the distinctive traditional intellectual integrity that characterizes its discipline. Currently that approach to the hiring of academics helps somewhat to insure that natural science departments continue to be staffed with persons whose professional activity is informed by a philosophy of naturalism.

However, such hiring practices cut both ways, as they say. That method of hiring helps to insure that some other kinds of academic departments remain staffed by
persons whose professional activity is quality–controlled according to certain kinds of superstitious assumptions that are generally respected among practitioners of the disciplines that those departments represent. Thus, many social science departments have come to be staffed exclusively by faculty members who assume that the behavior exhibited by a human body is essentially spirit–driven, be that spirit a rather secular and willful self–agent or a religiously inspired soul–like ethereality.4

Under all such assumptions, the environment does not exert a strict functional control over behavior. Instead, at most, parts of the environment may be taken discretionarily into some degree of account by the responsible indwelling manager. Details about the neurological activity through which that agent is presumed to produce behavior are often brought to bear in scholarly service to that basic assumption. Physiological studies of the ongoing neural activity during the production of observed behavior tend to shift attention away from the scientifically unfashionable superstitious assumption that that behavior is both originated and initiated by some kind of self–agent. Thus, evidence from brain science may be adduced in scholarly explications of what are assumed to be the operations of the agent. To the extent that it is acceptable to be explicit about the supernatural, those accounts may be asserted to reveal certain aspects of an ethereal self–agent’s use of some neural body parts in the exercise of its will. On the other hand, where such blatant superstition is unfashionable, evidence of the neural activity may be presented in support of some concept of “how a person thinks.” Such references to persons thinking are typically left vague with respect to the presumed nature of both person and thought.

Again, as always, philosophy matters. The basic aagential assumption affects just about everything that happens under the professional umbrella of an academic department that is organized around it. Included are the curricular decisions, such as the selection of the subject matter to be taught, the kinds of objectives established for the students with respect to the subject matter, and the nature of the pedagogy that is practiced by the faculty. For instance, these would all tend to be different depending on whether the faculty members of a social science department behaved a superstition–based philosophy or a natural philosophy by which their data on social phenomena are interpreted.

The scientists who now work in a natural science department within a public university may assume that they are officially sanctioned by their institutions to maintain the naturalism that informs the kind of scientific practice that has come to be definitive of their field. However, the general faculty members in units beyond the natural science departments, as well as the central administrators of such institutions, are formally entitled to recognize a kind of departmental integrity that pertains only to the distinctiveness of its subject matter (i.e., to what is studied), not the personal epistemology of the faculty members (i.e., to how, intellectually, it is studied). To the occasional dismay of some faculty members in the natural sciences, that is the perspective from which many administrators as well as faculty members from other departments tend to approach that issue.

The faculty members in a given natural science department may argue that the philosophy of naturalism affords the best available quality–control for the scientific practices that are required to probe the kind of phenomena that are of concern in that field. However, in an institution that is supported by a population with a vast majority of strongly superstitious people, and in which a substantial majority of the faculty members and administrators also behave in similarly superstitious ways, it usually remains counterproductive to raise the issue of qualitative comparisons among differing epistemological and ontological perspectives no matter how relevant that issue may be.

Institutional administrators and faculty members who work outside of the natural science units may point to what they construe to be an intellectual imbalance in the faculty of a natural science department. Such external critics may

4 As noted earlier in this book, such assumptions support the concept of personal responsibility insofar as under those assumptions operant behavior is the discretionary product of a willful agent (called the person) that must then be held accountable. If the individual exhibits a pattern of rather consistently abhorrent behavior, the individual may be deemed to be intrinsically evil in the sense of being host to an evil person–agent—or in the opposite case, saintly. In analyzing behavior from that general perspective, both the conditioning of behavior and the implications of such conditioning are neglected, because a conditioning process is of little or no relevance with respect to behavior that putatively happens according to the will of an entirely or mostly autonomous agent. Under such assumptions, the analysis of behavior would instead have to focus on the nature of the putative agent that discretionarily and willfully originates and oversees the execution of that behavior. In some versions, especially those promulgated by certain religious agencies, the intrinsic spiritual self–agent can come under the influence of powerful external spirits that may compete for their respective shares of such control. Some Christian versions feature the Devil and God in those oppositional roles, but those putative ethereal external agents merely allude respectively to sets of contingencies that produce behavior that respects or disrespects the moral and ethical code of conduct that is prescribed under the prevailing religious ideology.
even argue that that department is deficient in representa-
tives of certain epistemological perspectives apart from
scientific naturalism that they regard as essential to the
interests and welfare of human beings. Although such ass-
saults against physics, chemistry, and biology depart-
ments have become rare in modern times, such hostile
criticism remains especially likely with respect to those
very rare social science departments in which natural sci-
entists of social phenomena have attained a majority.

Furthermore, most university administrators respect
the general principle that any strongly represented episte-
omological perspective in the general population outside
of the university (as well as the concepts and the intellec-
tual operations that are supported by that perspective)
should also be proportionally represented among the fac-
ulty members of any university that public tax dollars
support. Thus, administrators in public universities often
tend to regard the maintenance of intellectual balance as
an element of prudently political democracy, and they
accept the maintenance of such balance within their
institutions as one of their professional responsibilities.

Within a university, that intellectual diversity may
remain interdepartmental, manifesting across the various
departments each of which maintains its particular inter-
nal intellectual integrity. However, administrators may
also intervene in that regard at the departmental level,
which some administrators believe to be the organiza-
tional level at which such philosophical diversity should
manifest. Within their institutions, they act to insure that
an epistemological mix is reflected intradepartmentally.

The two most frequent forms of enforcement with
respect to unit faculties that are deemed to have become
too naturalistic are (a) refusal to approve the further hir-
ing of additional persons who seem to interpret relevant
data on the basis of naturalistic assumptions, and (b) the
imposition of requirements that natural scientists assert
or acknowledge in their classrooms that superstitious
assumptions can also lead to useful and valid interpreta-
tions of data. A typical tactic is simply to assign a natural
scientist to teach courses with previously fixed curricula
and designated textbooks all of which have undergone
content adjustments to present a balance between
naturalism and its alternatives. If a faculty member re-
fuses to engage in such a contradiction of personal intel-
lectual integrity, that faculty member, if without tenure,
is subject to a simple nonrenewal of annual contract. A
tenured faculty member who would refuse to accept such
a violation of personal integrity is typically subject to so
many forms of career inhibiting harassment and retribu-
tion that, arguably, relatively few who are subjected to
such coercion tend to assert themselves in that way.5

Thus, absent a respect for qualitative criteria pertin-
ent to different ways of coming to know, the otherwise
worthy quest for balance, equity, and fairness within a
university can result inadvertently in a degradation in the
capacity of a departmental faculty for intellectual
effectiveness. That occurs if the quest for diversity is ex-
tended to the level of respective personal philosophy
among the members of each departmental faculty. That
kind of error in managing intellectual diversity implies a
respect only for philosophical difference coupled with dis-
regard for the qualitative implications of the differing
philosophical perspectives.

While a faculty member’s skin shade probably has no
direct functional effect on the quality of that faculty
member’s professional work, a faculty member’s philo-
osophical repertoire certainly does have such an effect
and does so in ways that have relevant, substantial, and
important qualitative implications. Pressure for equal epistemo-
logical and ontological representation among faculty
members presupposes that a touted alternative is potentially
worthwhile, and advocacy for it often manifests as a de-
mand for the inclusion among the faculty of persons who
are conditioned to think in that way. Absent a qualitative
comparison, a person who thinks objectively about the
subject matter may be excluded to make room for a per-
son who thinks superstitiously about the subject matter.6

represents a potentially worthwhile alternative to a natu-
ralistic perspective may do so on two bases. First, that sci-
entist can publicly decline to breach professorial integrity
by teaching as worthwhile an intellectual mode that that
professor regards as fallacious nonsense, which relies on
the protective umbrella of the First Amendment. Second,
that scientist can build a career that is established largely
outside of the institution in which he or she is employed.
That is accomplished by insuring that the important en-
tries on one’s professional résumé pertain largely to ac-
complishments the definitive variables of which are
accessed outside of the institution in which one is em-
ployed (e.g., professional publications, convention pre-
sentations, positions in state and national professional
organizations, appointments to government posts, etc.).
That hinders the hostile manipulation of one’s career—de-
ing opportunities by political enemies within the insti-
tution in which one is employed. Local administrators
may attempt to regain control by insisting that the crite-
ria for faculty performance evaluations must include the
requirement of a substantial percentage of local service, a
faculty member’s opportunities for which they can then
manipulate politically.

6 A contemporary example is the effort to install creationists
among science department faculties by people who as-
sume that natural complexity is indicative of a mysterious

5 A natural scientist who regards superstition as counter–
humanistic and on that basis refuses to teach it as if it

6 A contemporary example is the effort to install creationists
among science department faculties by people who as-
sume that natural complexity is indicative of a mysterious
Such a result conflicts in one important way with the purported cultural mission of the institution. That is, insofar as the interpretation of data on the basis of superstitious assumptions yields less effective outcomes, the capacity of that university unit to produce worthwhile products will have been reduced. If the qualitative criteria for the outcomes of such scholarly work pertain to the ratio of positive reinforcement to aversive stimulation (a.k.a. the quality of life) for the ultimate consumers of the intellectual products, then it remains difficult to find examples in which superstitious assumptions inform a higher quality of scholarly work than do the assumptions of scientific naturalism.

Whenever superstitiously produced assumptions and naturalistic assumptions are mentioned in a contrasting way, one must recall the nature of their respective origins. Basic assumptions of naturalism tend to arise by induction from a vast array of objective data, while, in contrast, superstitious assumptions tend to arise constructively—that is, they are invented without natural constraints to serve in pseudoaccounts of contacted events.

To the extent that intellectual diversity may be worthwhile, let us consider the circumstances under which that is and is not true. Suppose that the diversity manifests in the form of different theories that are derived from respective sets of relevant data. We regard that diversity as worthwhile if all of those derivations represent objective exercises performed on available but limited sets of objectively produced data. The theories differ, not because the data have been interpreted on the basis of differing assumptions about nature, but because those theories are based on different sets of relevant data.

However, a new theory that is merely constructed interpretively to comport with superstitious assumptions represents an intellectually corrupted kind of diversity that contributes little if anything to furthering the cultural mission of a university.

Confounding those two classes of diversity is a common mistake the avoidance of which can be facilitated through recourse to the behaviorological specialization that we may designate as comparative intellectuality. That is one aspect of behaviorological science that a cultural institution, purportedly existing to foster intellectual development, can ill–afford to neglect either in an administrative or curricular way.

More specifically, the appropriate kind of intellectual diversity within a university obtains among objectively derived yet conflicting theories. Such conflict remains unresolved only for temporary lack of sufficient and relevant data. Persons who exhibit explanatory recourse to superstition commonly produce theories that are intrinsically invalid, not because of an insufficiency of relevant and valid data, but because those data are interpreted so as to comport with superstitious assumptions.

Such theories are intrinsically invalid from the outset, because they do not pertain to relations that feature exclusively real variables between which a flow of energy can be traced. Furthermore, cluttering the theoretical landscape with a proliferation of theories that are inherently invalid because of the way that they are produced can confuse consumers of the intellectual products of the institution and unnecessarily multiply the difficulties of the academic mission.

Scientists and scholars, when free to operate objectively on the basis of naturalism, can pursue the important work of generating and resolving conflicts among what remain potentially valid theories. However, confronted with a proliferation of invalidly constructed theories, natural scientists and scholars must divert personal resources wastefully at an unproductive level of contention. That raises the question of why an invalid class of theories that arises on the basis of superstitious assumptions should not be subject to preliminary disqualification before they are entertained in the academic arena.

In universities, regardless of the field of study or the discipline by which that study is conducted, in the normal course of academic operations two classes of events are ideally subject to culling according to qualitative criteria. The first class of events consists of relevant operant behaviors, and the second class of events consists of the procedures by which those operant behaviors come to be conditioned and controlled in the first place.

Many of the important behaviors in scientific and scholarly activity are verbal as are many aspects of both their conditioning and residual controls. To put it in common parlance, universities exist not only to sort out
ideas according to their efficacy but to sort out the ways of thinking by which ideas are generated in the first place. The grand contest of efficacy, which universities exist to conduct, pertains not only to what is said and done there about human interactions with the environment, but also to the ways and means by which the relevant behavior is generated and maintained. It is not only that superstitiously established ideas tend to be inefficacious, the superstitious nature of the controls under which such ideas emerge is of an intellectually inferior quality that merits preliminary disqualification in the academic arena. The problem inheres in distinguishing among patterns of behaving with respect to which people may have become complacent.

Also, people may argue that the intrinsic academic operations of universities should feature precisely such contests of efficacy—contests that pit superstitiously philosophical foundations against non–superstitious philosophical foundations, especially when the kind of superstition in question pertains to the nature of human beings and their behavior. A counterargument is that such a contest would amount to a waste of the university on what should already be a well settled issue and that the quality–maintaining mechanism that the university represents should be focused on more relevant and important issues than the relative efficacy of objectivity and superstition.

Apart from the question of whether a university faculty and administration should pursue an academic mission that features a mix of superstitiously and objectively informed activity, the relative efficacy of superstition and objectivity remains suitable subject matter for inclusion in the curriculum. That is, students who cannot yet respond effectively to that issue should receive instruction pertaining both to the contrasting nature of objectivity and superstition and to the kinds of contingencies that have fueled the conflict between their respective proponents. But arguably, confusion among naive students about that issue should no longer be matched by a similar confusion among those who operate the institution. That is, confusion about the potential validity of superstition should no longer muddle the intrinsic operations of a university. The extent to which that continues to occur affords a qualitative measure of the effectiveness and efficiency of universities in general or of a particular institution. Superstitious intrinsic pollution is an important criterion by which prospective students and their supporters can evaluate the suitability of a prospective institution to provide a worthwhile higher education.7

Let us now return to the phrase natural science. In the verbal behavior of various individuals the tact natural science does not "mean the same thing" to people outside of the natural science community and to people outside of it. The two groups may be said to "have different respective concepts" of natural science.

For example, people outside of the natural sciences may argue that the study of a particular supernatural phenomenon belongs in whichever natural science department studies the class of real events to which that superstition most closely pertains. Consider a rather common kind of example: Some such outsiders may assume that the origination or arrival of a soul invests an embryo with its vital human essence. They argue that the nature of souls and their relations to human bodies be studied in biology departments, because a soul pertains to the vital nature of certain life forms, and life forms constitute the general subject matter of biology departments.

Natural scientists in biology departments would tend to resist the addition of such subject matter to their curriculum, because the superstitious kind of knowing that establishes the putative ontological status of souls is qualitatively out of bounds relative to the natural science perspective. That superstitious kind of knowing–behavior represents a kind of ontology and epistemology that does not comport with the philosophy of naturalism. At issue is whether the curricular content in a biology department is its underlying assumptions. Whether teaching, administering, or doing research, interpretations occurring under the control of superstitiously crafted assumptions would be degrading the effectiveness of the outcomes. Such a general behavioral problem, which typically stems from a broad lack of training in a critical natural science and its philosophy, is similar to the physical problem that would inhere if the institution's buildings had been designed and constructed by people who had never been trained to respect the principles of physics and the underlying natural philosophy. During practical operations the adverse implications of neglecting any one of the basic natural sciences tend to prove inescapable.

7 Intrauniversity academic operations define an applied specialization within behaviorology. An institution that relied on superstition in its internal operations and which touted recourse to superstition in its curriculum would presumably be doing so because its operators lacked sufficient training in the natural science of behavior and
partment is to be determined only by general thematic criteria or whether the subject matter must also pass the quality-controlling tests to which people refer as a respect for naturalism. In a natural science subcommunity such as biology an element of legitimate subject matter must not only be thematically relevant, it must also originally have come to be known in an epistemologically acceptable way. That is, the behavior of knowing it must have been conditioned through relevant scientific practices that insure the quality of objectivity.

Ironically, other than among the natural scientists themselves, the academic units devoted to the natural sciences are not officially recognized as such on the basis of the most essential and critical aspect of the natural sciences—namely, the philosophy of scientific naturalism. Thus, the natural scientists within public universities are compelled to rely only on informal support in their efforts to maintain the epistemological integrity of their disciplines—a delicate and often tenuous kind of support that they have cultivated across the past few centuries.

A few private universities that are formally committed to scientific excellence may effectively support and protect the epistemological integrity of their natural science departments. However, in private universities that are sponsored by superstitious factions of the general population, and which exist in part to indoctrinate (i.e., condition) students in the particular kind of superstition respected within the sponsoring faction, the faculty members in the so-called natural science departments of such universities are often explicitly screened to preclude the presence of individuals whose personal philosophical verbal behavior meets the criteria for a comprehensive scientific naturalism. In the resulting science departments, scientific methods are emulated, but the curriculum is culled to eliminate the objective treatment of topics, themes, or phenomena that are exclusively reserved for superstitious treatment within the population segment that sponsors that institution. The science that is then practiced there (pertinent only to permitted themes) establishes facts that are then subject to a kind of superstitious interpretation that is presumed to be beyond the reach of scientific thought. In that way, the implications of scientific findings are not only prevented from contradicting the dogma of the sponsoring community but are interpreted as if to support it. The science faculty members in such institutions are thus intellectually constrained. Their own scientific findings must be entrusted to the community for what is deemed to be a proper interpretation in light of the prevailing superstitious assumptions, and they are expected to concur with such interpretations. B.F. Skinner noted in chapter 1 of Science and Human Behavior (p. 6) that science not only establishes facts but supplies its own wisdom. Science leads not only to the induction of specific principles pertinent to particular subject matters but also to the induction of philosophical assumptions by which to make sense of its own discoveries in relation to the world at large. Those who operate universities in service to superstition-based communities are reluctant to let their resident scientists go that far, and their methods of control include conditioning members of their science faculties to avoid doing so. Thus, routine aversive conditioning can leave a member of the science faculty feeling guilty, shameful, or sinful in the event of an impending interpretive deviation from the prescribed dogma of the sponsoring community, while interpretations that hew to the prevailing ideology may result in contacts with an assortment of socially mediated reinforceurs.
inquiries be interpreted to comport with the assumptions that underlie superstitiously informed dogma.

A modern counterstrategy by the forces or organized religious superstition has been, first, to divorce one of its most fundamental ideas (viz., the complexities of nature require intelligent design) from formal religious categorization and then to appeal on the basis of fairness and balance in behalf of its inclusion in natural science curricula. That approach has been met by only one of two obvious levels of resistance from the natural science community. Namely, it has been argued that the intruding superstitious idea is essentially religious regardless of the seemingly secular casting of its current spin and therefore remains subject to constitutional prohibition.

To the extent that that defense would fail, especially in its judicial tests, the natural science community could be left, apart from acquiescence, with no alternative other than to incorporate religious superstition within the proper of its long-standing general activity against superstition—or at least the kinds of religious superstition that fuel intrusive interferences with scientific programs. The natural science community has traditionally waged that campaign on the basis of the general inefficaciousness and unreliability of any kind of superstitious knowing and on the basis of the inferior intellectuality that is connoted by recourse to superstition in the process of coming to know. With respect to its intrinsic quality, arguably, no kind of superstitious thinking merits an exemption. However, within contemporary culture the forces of organized religious superstition are strongly established, and the contemplation of activity against the interests of that powerful cultural entity tends to elicit trepidation.

Preparing the Natural Science Community for Further Service to Human Culture

Given any natural phenomenon (i.e., any measurable and therefore real event), theoretically, an objective way of studying it exists or can be developed within the purview of science. As natural scientists are often quick to suggest, anything that is measurable (i.e., real) can be studied from a natural science perspective. Given a real phenomenon, it may not lie within a particular natural scientist's field of specialization, but it will almost surely lie within some other natural scientist's field of specialization (and if not, it potentially could do so).

An often posed question asks how superstition can survive or coexist with scientific objectivity insofar as they are antithetical. But in many situations those interpretive perspectives do not interfere with each other. Note that while objective study establishes facts that pass tests for reliability, various parties who subsequently will exhibit quite different interpretations of those facts may all appreciate the reliability that scientific study imparts to the facts that it establishes. Given the objectively produced facts, the respective interpretations of those facts by the disparate parties then tend to serve the contingencies under which the relevant investigation or its review was undertaken.

For instance, both a natural scientist and a religious creationist may favor studies that are sufficiently objective to establish the irrefutable nature and order of certain rock strata—data that both parties may find useful when digging wells, developing mining operations, and cutting roadways through mountains. But while a geologist may interpret those stratigraphic data as evidence of successive cycles of encroachment and retreat by a 700 million-year-old sea, a religious creationist may interpret those same data as evidence of how God stacked the rocks when quickly and miraculously creating the world only several thousand years ago.

In such cases, the events featured in the superstitiously informed interpretations always lie beyond the purview of the interpreter's practical experience. Consider a superstitiously informed creationist who treats important practical matters with objectivity and behaves logically with respect to practical interests. The presumed miraculous involvement of the creator, as cast by that person, tends to recede deeper into the haze of antiquity safely beyond the milieu of functional relations that define the person's current practical concerns. Currently, for a natural scientist working in the field of cosmology who suffers a lingering susceptibility to that kind of superstition, the miraculous creation of the universe may have receded all the way back to the Big Bang.

As noted, some members of the contemporary natural science community have stopped short of the general conclusion that natural philosophy always trumps superstition in the grand contest of efficacy. With respect to work in their own specialty, they may be prepared to argue that not only should natural science prevail in that specialization, but so should naturalistic interpretations. However, at the same time, from their somewhat parochial perspective, they may agree that superstitious inquiry is perhaps better, or at least acceptable, with respect to some subject matters that lie beyond the concerns that define their own field of inquiry. Or, while insisting upon objective science for all inquiries, they may nevertheless accept interpretations of objectively produced data that have been rendered according to superstitious assumptions, especially with respect to certain matters that lie outside of their own fields.

Other natural scientists in similar circumstances have exhibited a different reaction. After observing that functional accounts tend to emerge given sufficiently persistent objective inquiry, they have arrived by induction at the principle of primacy for naturalism and for the kind of practices that it informs. While as individuals they cannot be specialists in all fields, they have come to as-
sume that the natural science perspective affords the most efficacious approach to any real phenomenon whether in their own field or in another field. They also assume that a philosophy of naturalism affords the most promising interpretation of the findings.

They may insist that, because of their more cosmopolitan perspective on natural science, they have thereby attained the highest rank of membership in the natural science community. In their elevated perspective, the members of the former group represent a subclass that has yet to attain full intellectual status in the natural science community, because when considering matters that are beyond the limits of their own respective specializations those seminaturalists may unabashedly exhibit or at least tolerate explanatory recourse to superstition as an alternative to a more objective approach.

A substantial debate within the natural science community is thus framed: Is there really any class of measurable events for which the outcomes and implications of natural scientific study do not serve human culture better than the outcomes and implications of a superstitious treatment? If any phenomena are asserted to be such, would the natural scientists in whose specializations those events fall also agree with that assessment? Once those scientific specialists entered their kind of outcomes into a contest of efficacy in competition with the kind of outcomes provided by the purveyors of superstition, would the natural scientists prevail, and what kind of criteria would have to be respected for them to do so? If the interests of certain individuals are well served by investments in superstitious behavior, is their community in general, and the culture of which it is a part, equally well served? That is, when individuals prosper by indulgence in superstition, what are the long term implications of their doing so for the culture of which they are a part?

These queries implicitly throw the gauntlet of naturalism before the superstitious throng, but should it be picked up with respect to specific phenomena, the natural science community may find that to win many of the ensuing contests it must have inducted the behaviorologists well into its own ranks. [The “Editor’s Note” after the References supplements this point with information from related sources.—Ed.] That is because many of the classes of phenomena with respect to which troublesome problems arise are defined by variables that lie beyond the effective range of physics, chemistry, and biology. The substantial control of the culture that is enjoyed by purveyors of superstition is largely effectuated by focusing on events in the subject matter of the one major basic natural science discipline that the natural science community has tended to neglect. That basic natural science discipline has its own level of analysis for the study of an important class of real phenomena that the traditional basic natural sciences do not subsume and which the purveyors of superstition have been allowed to claim as their exclusive operational domain.

Our world is plagued by acts of terrorism that are informed by superstitious assumptions, and wars are fought to protect investments in the implications of superstition. Vast numbers of people suffer, many horribly, under irrational laws and policies that have followed from superstitious interpretations. Such strictures are typically enforced with intense patterns of behavior that are said to reflect righteous conviction, as if intensity of belief could acceptably substitute for objectivity. Many of the problems that arise in connection with such tragic circumstances pertain only in tenuous and peripheral ways to the nature of energy, the structure of matter, and the biological processes of life. It is to human behavior that those problems often pertain directly and, importantly, less to how the behavior happens than to why it happens.

There is a natural science that exists for the address of precisely such matters. But the natural science community must be rendered complete if it is to bring that discipline to bear in ways that can preclude superstition–fueled hostilities and alleviate suffering that now occurs under constraints imposed in respect of superstitious assumptions. The quality of life has been improved greatly in various ways that define the effective reach of the traditional natural science disciplines, but the lack of a natural behavior science among them has resulted in a human culture that is increasingly characterized by the accumulating implications of that neglect. That is, although contemporary human culture is characterized by people who can live a hundred years, travel through space in rocket ships, and clean their clothing in wondrous and easy ways, they nevertheless tend to babble about behavioral events in often simplistic and intellectually immature ways that too frequently spawn foolish and harmful practices that result in unnecessary suffering on a vast scale.

Insofar as science and philosophy manifest as ways of behaving both muscularily and neurally, as does superstition, behaviorology is not only the natural science of science and the natural science of philosophy, it is also the natural science of superstition…. Contemporary culture is coming to be dominated by increasingly organized superstition the most touted benefits of which arguably can be duplicated or replaced through an objective approach. The literature of applied behaviorology is devoted to numerous and various instances of recourse to the objective alternative.

Nevertheless, continued respect for superstitious assumptions often takes the form of irrational practices that result in vast but preventable human suffering of various kinds. Such superstition represents a behavioral cancer of the cultural integrity to which the natural science community has not been prepared to respond most effectively. Traditionally, natural scientists have made remarkable
progress in improving the external environment and in the repair and maintenance of bodies, but increasingly, the most threatening problems pertain to human behavior per se. Without behaviorology among the disciplines that the natural science community can bring to bear, the natural science community continues to facilitate comfortable individual lives the majority of which are behavied in service to what arguably amounts to a preventable retardation of cultural progress, often through discrediting natural science per se.

For example, consider persons who are meeting to plan a strategy by which students in public schools may be permitted to substitute courses in Bible study for currently required courses in the natural sciences. They are likely to have driven to that meeting in automobiles. Most or all of them will probably arrive well nourished and in a state of well maintained good health. They will tend to be dressed comfortably and attractively in clothing that is made from a variety of fabrics the fibers of which were invented by chemists. However, it is not via physics, biology, nor chemistry that the most effective case can be mounted by the community of natural science to counter their superstitionally informed objective. Behaviorology is better matched to the demands of that challenge.\

References


Editor’s Supplement to Natural Science, Superstition, & Academic Institutions

Must Correct Missed Chance

Perhaps the present scenerio of natural scientists needing to fully induct behaviorology to our culture’s natural science roundtable would not have occurred had behaviorology emerged out of one or another already extant natural science discipline rather than originating as it did as an ever unwelcome part of a non–natural–science discipline (psychology). Actually, behaviorology came close to emerging from biology, as B.F. Skinner (the foundational natural scientist of behavior) came close, in the 1930s, to taking his degree through a biology department.

Skinner had early on begun using the life–science selection paradigm, typical of the natural science of biology, in the task of developing a natural science of behavior, especially the behavior of people. Even though Skinner was operating within the department of psychology at Harvard University, he did much of his pre–graduation work under W.J. Crozier, the head of the physiology branch of Harvard’s biology department (Skinner, 1979, p. 16; also see Ledoux, 1997/2004, and Fraley & Ledoux, 1997/2006). Crozier had been a student of the biologist Jacques Loeb, and both Crozier and Loeb had emphasized the causal mechanism of selection in their natural science work. Skinner, perhaps without initially realizing he was doing so, transferred the concept of selection from biology to behavior relations. He thereby brought a particular natural science paradigm to bear on the questions of a naturalism–informed scientific study of behavior.

Unfortunately for our present circumstances, even though he did not then, or ever, fit psychology philosophically or scientifically, Skinner officially took his degree through the psychology department, precipitating the current disconnect between the natural science of environment–behavior relations and the rest of the natural science community (whose students have hence for decades generally ended up taking traditional [superstitious] psychology to fulfill undergraduate graduation requirements). Thus, the community of natural sciences, arguably to serve its culture’s best interests (and give its students a more appropriate behavior–related discipline to study to fulfill undergraduate graduation requirements), needs now to take the steps to include behaviorology at its roundtable as soon as possible, implementing full support for behaviorological programs and departments, etc.—Ed.\

References

Behaviorology Curricula in Higher Education

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Editor’s Note: Occasionally, Behaviorology Today (BT) includes a piece that has gone through a full peer-review process. According to BT policy, when this is the case, a very clear notice to that effect is to be included with the piece. In compliance with this policy: This paper has been fully peer reviewed.

Parts of this paper were originally included in an early 1980s proposal requested by the Institute for the Study of Applied Behavior Analysis (Potsdam, NY) concerning potential extensions of the Institute’s curricula. The paper was then completed for presentation as the author’s TIBA (The International Behaviorology Association) presidential address at the second TIBA convention (Comunidad Los Horcones, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico, January 1990).

An early point in this paper concerns the need for “consensus regarding the repertoires of behaviorologists and the curricula to generate those repertoires.” In an effort to build even more consensus, this paper was submitted to Behaviorology for full peer review, even though as a presidential address it was to be automatically accepted. On the basis of the full peer review, the paper was again accepted by Behaviorology. Later, with explanations regarding shifting journal content-type allocations, the paper was transferred to The International Behaviorologist (TIB), the other TIBA peer-reviewed journal. As of the publication of Origins and Components of Behaviorology (the 1997 book of readings that included this paper with minor revisions; see Ledoux, 2002a) the first issue of TIB, in which this article was scheduled for inclusion, had not yet been published, and has yet to appear. The version of this paper that is presented here is the same—it has not been changed—as the version in Ledoux, 2002a. (Note that TIBI subsequently grew out of TIBA after TIBA became ISB [International Society for Behaviorology]; see Ledoux, 2002b. Also, the bibliography in Ledoux, 2002a, includes items that may be usable in some of the courses described in this paper.)

As TIBI has developed, its courses (the syllabi for which appear in the pages of this journal—see the Syllabus Directory at the back of this issue) have not merely repeated those in this paper. Rather, they have, as the paper suggests, reflected a combination of the courses described here and the behaviorology courses that have become available, through various considerations and reasons, at other higher education institutions.—Ed.

The By-laws of the professional organization of behaviorologists, The International Behaviorology Association (TIBA), state that one of several purposes of TIBA is “to promote a scientific ‘Behavior Literacy’ graduation requirement of appropriate content and depth at all levels of educational institutions from kindergarten through university” (TIBA, 1989, p. 3 [Also, see TIBI’s Purposes, at the back of each issue of BT.—Ed.]). To carry out this and other TIBA purposes, large numbers of fully trained behaviorologists are needed.

Some General Behaviorology Training Concerns

Since comprehensive professional training historically occurs at colleges and universities, behaviorologists’ initial efforts regarding training programs should address curricula at that level. Therefore, this paper focuses on behaviorology curricula in higher education, including curricula at the Associate (A.A.), Baccalaureate (B.A.), and Master of Arts (M.A.) / Master of Science (M.S.) degree levels.

Consensus

The success of curriculum development efforts depends in part on consensus regarding the repertoires of behaviorologists and the curricula to generate those repertoires. So, one purpose of this paper is to contribute to the development of that consensus.

Achieving consensus on repertoires and curricula can facilitate the development of additional academic homes and programs of behaviorology in which to implement such curricula. Descriptions of the repertoires of behaviorologists provide standards against which professional organizations evaluate curricular programs for certification or accreditation. Consensus statements about the desired repertoires—in the form of a variety of general and specific program descriptions as presented here, or in other forms—could assist behaviorologists as they prepare proposals to establish or expand programs in their own academic units. Behaviorologists could point to the consensus as an appropriate indication of disciplinary maturity, organization, and solidarity, and these are important characteristics that would likely be taken into account by those to whom behaviorologists present program proposals.

Consensus can, and perhaps must, vary across academic levels. Given the foundational nature of the A.A. and B.A. levels, consensus at these levels is especially important and might be easier to obtain. Other natural science disciplines have reached a workable consensus on curricula at those levels. Given the increasing specializa-
tion for which graduate trainees prepare, programs at m.a. and doctoral levels are more variable, making standardization more difficult. Consensus for these higher levels usually involves more general guidelines with respect to the repertoire components that denote a specialization within a behaviorological repertoire.

Curricular Design Alternatives

The behaviorological literature already contains expressions of concern (e.g., Michael, 1980) about the contents of training programs for professionals in the science of behavior founded by B.F. Skinner. Most such articles, however, were written while behaviorological science shared a history (Ledoux, 1997a) with another discipline. They focused on training problems that arose from that residence, such as the requirement that some training time be devoted to courses with cognitive/mentalistic contents (see Fraley & Ledoux, 1997, for a full discussion). These articles addressed the question of what should be done with our share of the training time (which often shrank even as the scientific content to be covered expanded). This paper explicitly addresses the chief alternative by posing the question of what we want to do with behaviorology training time when we behaviorologists are responsible for all of it. How should behaviorologists be trained?

One approach to designing curricula starts by describing an ideal finished product: the repertoires whose refinement and manifestation denote a behaviorologist. In this approach, a curricula organizer might specify a comprehensive list of behavioral objectives relevant to the topics in the subject matter of behaviorology and design curricula around that list.

At the first TIBA convention, Michael (1988) presented a tentative list of important topics in behaviorology. His list included both respondent and operant conditioning, and virtually all known subtopics. Behaviorologists might add to this list the appropriate philosophical, analytical, technological, and other relevant topics to create a master list. That master list could be organized under conceptual headings that could become parts of course titles, including “Conceptual Foundations” (philosophical, analytical, interpretative, and historical), “Experimental Foundations” (basic and applied measurement, methodology, and research), and “Technological Foundations” (effective applications in general and in specific areas). This might be the approach of choice, especially when designing curricula in a situation free of those current administrative contingencies in higher education that constrain effective educational practices.

The approach of this paper differs. For convenience, it uses the firmly established and administratively sanctioned degree structure of higher education in the United States of America (i.e., A.A., B.A., M.A./M.S., and Ph.D.) as a familiar foundation, while acknowledging other equally viable systems. More specifically, the curricular designs presented here take into account various (and sometimes constraining) academic and administrative contingencies. An example of a constraining contingency would be the requirement that all students conform their speed of progress on a set of course materials to a particular amount of time (for instance, three contact–hours per week for a 15–week semester). At the same time, the curricular designs presented here seek to provide, through as much practice of behaviorologically sound educational methods as possible, some of the evidence upon which to base improvements to administrative contingencies, improvements that bring those contingencies and improved educational methods into conformity.

This design option then proceeds by bringing together aspects of the programs and courses through which behaviorologists currently teach approximations of the complete behaviorological repertoire in various educational settings. These programs and courses appear here as a series of curricular structures. While specifically not designed for any particular institution, the description of these curricular structures may ease the task for others who are designing programs by providing a set of patterns and components that they can adapt to their own situation. To the extent that the curricular structures and components described herein derive from the current teaching activities of behaviorologists, some consensus is automatically inherent.

Facets of Program Design

Program design involves at least three facets: (a) curricular concerns which center on course descriptions, course sequences, and component courses of degree programs, (b) resource concerns which center on staff, facilities, and materials, and (c) instructional concerns which center on staff skills and instructional design and programming for each course. The design option presented here emphasizes the curricular concerns, and acknowledges that resource concerns are specific to the educational institution in which a program designer operates.

With respect to the instructional concerns, this design option reiterates the demonstrated value of implementing the educational methods derived from behaviorological science (see Johnson & Layng, 1992; J. Vargas, 1988). This design option also supports the improvements to administrative contingencies implicit in that science. For instance, on the basis of the type and the extent of the repertoire that is conducive to effective educational design, Vargas and Fraley (1976; also see Vargas, 1996) proposed dividing the content and process functions of teachers between subject–matter experts (persons with an extensive repertoire in a particular subject matter) and educational design experts (persons with an extensive repertoire in educational behaviorology). Such a division would pro-
vide an important foundation for further improvements to administrative contingencies that could enhance the effectiveness of education throughout an institution’s programs. For instance, while design and content experts make equally vital contributions to the success of a course, one design expert can pair up with several content experts to achieve those results with many courses.

Curriculum Related Issues

The four programs described in detail here (of which three award certificates and one is the B.A. diploma) are not the first programs with behaviorological content. Most such programs, however, are embedded within the curricula of other disciplines or fields. For example, in the early 1970s, Joseph Morrow started offering an undergraduate, behaviorological science “Certificate in Behavior Modification” within the psychology department at California State University, Sacramento (see Ledoux, 1997a). Other examples are (a) the graduate training offered by Lawrence Fraley (see Fraley, 1996), Ernest Vargas, and Julie Vargas in education at West Virginia University, Morgantown, and (b) the graduate training offered by Jerome Ulman in special education at Ball State University, Muncie, IN. These are more appropriate because a number of basic disciplines, behaviorology among them, can inform an applied behavioral field such as education or special education, and some disciplines can do so more effectively than others.

Some programs are administered independently of other disciplines and fields. One example is the M.S. program with behaviorological content at North Texas State University (Denton) that Sigrid Glenn directs within a university unit separate from the departments of other disciplines or fields. In terms of resources, credibility, and stability, the establishment of programs within academic departments of behaviorology is preferred, perhaps with behaviorology departments being administered within larger academic units also responsible for other life sciences such as biology and cultureology (i.e., natural science anthropology; see Fraley & Ledoux, 1997, Ch. 6).

Overview of the Certificate and B.A. Programs

The programs will be described here as if they already existed so as to avoid excessive use of the subjunctive.

These programs provide one of various ways to organize comprehensive behaviorology training according to differing student needs. Students might include (a) those who want to fulfill a Behavior Literacy graduation requirement, (b) those who are majoring in behaviorology at the A.A. or B.A. (or M.A./M.S.) level so as to investigate or enter a career as a behaviorologist, and (c) those who are working or studying in another human–service or human–development field for which they want behaviorological input.

Behavior Literacy. The first program leads to a Behavior Literacy Certificate (BLC, or simply “Literacy Certificate”). The BLC requires nine semester hours (three courses) including six hours (a two–term sequence) of Introduction to Behaviorology. The third course, The Behaviorology of Child–Rearing Practices, is important, for it ties behaviorology in detail to a vital component of the daily life of virtually every person, behaviorologist or not. The third course thereby demonstrates in a practical way the value of Behavior Literacy. If this third course is unavailable, then (a) its topic should be incorporated into the remaining required courses (even though this would mean covering less detail in this and all other topics), and (b) a special certificate would not be warranted. The criterion of completing an especially demanding, three course, higher education Behavior Literacy graduation requirement justifies granting a certificate. (Other literacy graduation requirements, such as Computer Literacy requirements, rarely demand more than a two course sequence and may never earn a certificate.)

The ABC. The second program leads to a certificate called the Affiliate of Behaviorology Certificate (ABC, or simply “Affiliate Certificate”). This certificate requires three courses beyond the BLC, for a total of six courses. The ABC is an intermediate step, at the undergraduate level, between the minimum behavior literacy repertoire, represented by the BLC, and the two more advanced programs, one for majors and one for professionals, both of which incorporate this 18 semester–hour program. In essence, the ABC is similar to an undergraduate minor. With relevant changes in course numbers and levels (as indicated in the requirements for the ABC), this program could constitute a reasonable lower division or two–year college major at the A.A. level.

The PSBC. The third program leads to a certificate called the Professional Studies in Behaviorology Certificate (PSBC, or simply “Professional Certificate”). This is a 30 semester–hour program with four courses beyond the ABC. The PSBC provides basic training for non–behaviorological professionals. This specifically includes persons working or studying in another human–service or human–development field. The PSBC is designed to add a solid foundation in behaviorological science to their professional repertoires so that they may take into account implications of behaviorological science for their work. Whether they hold a graduate degree, an undergraduate degree, or as yet no degree, such professionals may seek this certificate because it is similar to a minimal major in behaviorology (like a second, or double, undergraduate major); meaningful benefits accrue without needing further graduate studies outside their original areas of pro-
fessional interest. Alternatively, they could seek a graduate behaviorology degree. (However, while the repertoire acquired through the PABC is appropriate for bringing behaviorology to bear on work in various applied behavioral fields, the more extensive repertoire acquired through the B.A. program is the preferred background for further study in behaviorology.)

The B.A. The fourth program adds nine courses to the ABC requirements and represents a strong, 45 credit-hour undergraduate major culminating in a baccalaureate degree. This program is designed to lay a thorough foundation both for entry-level employment in fields where behaviorology is the appropriate foundation science and for further graduate level studies in behaviorology.

Program Parameters

Program requirements reflect the familiar arrangements of courses each having three contact credit–hours attached, with three laboratory hours replacing one contact hour, in a 15–week semester. (These parameters, while not the best known arrangements, are used because they are the kinds of parameters program designers will likely face when they begin a program proposal. Improvements can be a part of a proposal or can follow at a later time.) Also, the course numbers used here reflect lower division credit (100/200 level), upper division credit (300 level), shared upper division/graduate credit (400 level), and graduate credit (500/600 level). To fulfill the requirements for elective courses, a variety of additional behaviorology courses that could serve as electives are included in the list of course descriptions.

As is typical of natural science training curricula, and to make these program descriptions more useful to program designers, the courses in the programs of this natural science follow systematic sequences. Repertoires gained in early courses form systematic foundations for the contents of later courses. So the courses are listed in a preferred enrollment sequence, with prerequisites noted explicitly. Instances where concurrent enrollment (corequisite) could be allowed to replace a prerequisite are listed as well. (The preferred enrollment sequences could not consistently reflect the arithmetic sequence of the course numbers because the actual numbers were arbitrarily selected to keep, if possible, thematically related courses numerically close.)

Specific Program Requirements

Behavior Literacy Certificate. The following fulfill a comprehensive higher education Behavior Literacy graduation requirement:

1. Behaviorology 101: Introduction to Behaviorology I. (Includes Lab on basic principles and methods.)
2. Behaviorology 102: Introduction to Behaviorology II. (Includes Lab in simple applied research and methods. Prerequisite [Pre]: Beh. 101.)

Affiliate Certificate. The first three requirements are equivalent to those for the Behavior Literacy Certificate. Additional requirements follow those three:

1–3. (As in the B.C.)
4. Behaviorology 320: History and Philosophy of Behaviorology. (Pre/Co: Beh. 102.) [In an A.A. program, the course number would indicate the lower division level, e.g., 220.]
5. Behaviorology 325: Behaviorology and Culture. (Pre: Beh. 102.) [In an A.A. program, the course number would indicate the lower division level, e.g., 225.]
6. Behaviorology 335: Survey of Behaviorology Applications. (Includes Lab/fieldwork in measurement and applied methods and research. Pre: Beh. 201.) [In an A.A. program, the course number would indicate the lower division level, e.g., 235.]

Professional Certificate. The first six requirements are equivalent to those for the Affiliate Certificate. Additional requirements follow those six:

1–6. (As in the A.B.C.)
8–9. Electives: two behaviorology courses relevant to the student’s professional area (see course descriptions).
10. Behaviorology 496: Professional Paper. (Pre: Beh. 355 and one of the electives; also, Pre/Co: the other elective.)

B.A. Program. The first six requirements are equivalent to those for the Affiliate Certificate. Additional requirements follow those six:

1–6. (As in the A.B.C.)
8–9. Electives: two Behaviorology courses (see course descriptions).
10. Behaviorology 340: Behaviorology in Education. (Includes a Lab on course and educational materials design. Pre: ABC.)
11. Behaviorology 395: Teaching Practicum in Behaviorology. (Pre: Beh. 340 plus the course in which the student is to assist.)
355 and one other behaviorology course; also Pre/Co: another behaviorology course.)

**General Program Requirements and Conventions**

In these programs a course counts toward requirements by meeting an appropriate level of behaviorologically based educational evaluation criteria. These criteria combine percentage, frequency, and other applicable measures, in overlapping parts of an instructional sequence. For example, percentage measures would apply more during the acquisition of new behaviors to meet the original specification (mastery) of any particular educational objective of a course, and would then overlap with frequency measures that apply more to the performance improvement and maintenance specification (fluency) of those educational objectives. Such measures would be involved with each objective as a student progresses through the series of objectives for a course.

Differences in usage, however, require a clarification about the term *mastery*. In some circles, mastery means setting a criterion, perhaps at a high level, for students to meet for a particular grade, as an alternative to grading students on a statistical curve. But in the context of behaviorology training, and in the more general context of behaviorology–derived practices in education, mastery implies much more than just meeting a set standard. In these contexts mastery requires at least (a) that material has been prepared for presentation in numerous small steps providing for, and demanding, a high density of successful and properly consequated student responses, (b) that students are not allowed to move on to another component until they are competent on previous components, and further (c) that the material has been approached systematically so that acquiring a repertoire in later components rests upon having already acquired a competent repertoire in earlier components. (Through this last requirement, mastery automatically contributes to fluency.)

Based on their understanding of mastery and fluency, behaviorology program operators will specify both the mastery–generating instructional design as well as the criteria by which a student’s passing a course will fulfill a program requirement. However, these programs operate within some administrative structure, and so will be required to state their design and criteria in terms amenable with the practices of that structure. (Discussion about improving those practices extends beyond the scope of this paper.)

Since administrative practices differ among institutions, an approximation of the relation between passing a course and fulfilling a program requirement provides an adequate starting point for program designers: For a course to count towards requirements, a student must pass it at the “A” level, representing a 90% mastery criterion combined with an appropriate fluency criterion. If a “B” or “C” is earned (80% and 70% respectively), the course might count for general academic credit but not toward these certificates or degrees until remediation to the “A” level has been completed. For a grade less than “C,” the student must repeat the full course, completing it at the “A” level (by remediation if necessary) before it can count towards fulfilling requirements.

Assuming that the methods of educational design used to teach these courses invoke the principles of behavior being taught, these standards should pose no unreasonable barriers for the typical student in higher education. Ideally, students should complete a course at their own pace, based on established yet evolving mastery/fluency criteria, and then move right along to the next course, regardless of calendar terms. This pacing may differ from the classic self–pacing of PSI (Personalized System of Instruction; see Keller & Sherman, 1982). Some research (see Buskist, Cush, & DeGrandpre, 1991) indicates that the classic self–pacing of PSI may not be absolutely required for educational success.

**Program Validation**

TIBA, through its Academic Affairs Committee, is undertaking to provide some form of certification or accreditation for behaviorology programs. TIBA might then review those programs every few years. For a program to be called a behaviorology program, it would meet the criteria set by TIBA. As more actual programs come on line, numerous minor variations from recommended programs will occur. This type of variation is normal, usually reflecting continuing advances in the discipline as a whole, and should disturb no one. For instance, the courses and requirements for a physics degree at Stanford differ from those at Yale, but no one has claimed one or the other to be inadequate on that basis. With respect to behaviorology, the programs described here are merely part of a larger number of programs that could fall within a range of acceptable criteria.

A range of criteria is appropriate for a discipline based on selection. The programs delineated in this paper would change over time also, within a range of acceptable criteria. These programs would change both as behaviorologists become more effective with respect to behavior–environment relations, and as solutions to curricular problems arise in the practice of designing and operating actual programs.

**Graduate Level Programs**

**Master's Program.** With the P8BC or, preferably, the B.A. program as a prerequisite, a masters–level program might require 30 additional credits over nine or ten
courses such as these (see the course descriptions for details on examples):

**Beh. 475: Verbal Behavior II.** (The course description includes a laboratory component on VB research. Pre: Beh. 355.)

**Beh. xxx.** An M.A. program includes at least one course, or preferably a two–course sequence, on research methods and measurement that covers a measurement–based analysis of behavior at the level of the specific properties of behavior, and that uses more up–to–date sources to cover the behaviorological material contained in works like Sidman’s (1988) Tactics of Scientific Research and Johnston and Pennypacker’s (1980) Strategies and Tactics of Human Behavioral Research.

**Beh. xxx.** An M.A. program includes at least one experimental research course involving laboratory responsibilities (e.g., Beh. 450).

**Beh. xxx.** An M.A. program includes at least one applied research and fieldwork course involving research and/or technological responsibilities (e.g., Beh. 490).

**Beh. xxx.** An M.A. program includes at least one seminar course (e.g., Beh. 430, 440, or 465).

**Beh. xxx.** An M.A. program includes three to five elective courses (9–15 credits, depending on the credit value of the thesis, to bring the total number of credits to at least 30) determined in consultation with the student’s advisor and considering the need for both generality and specialization at this level.

**Beh. 600: Master’s Thesis/Practicum.** With 1–6 credits, as determined by the student’s thesis committee in advance, and based on the scope of the work, this course should be taken in the final term prior to completion of all degree requirements.

A student may seek an M.A./M.S. degree in behaviorology without any previous behaviorology training. One starting point to plan graduate studies under this circumstance is to rely on the sequence of courses inherent in the system of prerequisites for required majors–level courses.

**Ph.D. Program.** Doctoral programs should require a third course, with a laboratory component, on advances in the analysis of verbal behavior. But beyond that, the more specialized nature of doctoral programs takes discussion of their contents beyond the scope of this paper.

### Behaviorology Courses

#### Descriptions of Principle Courses in these Programs

Various behaviorology courses are described. These include a range of potential elective courses since electives are among the proposed requirements. Logical prerequisites are also listed. With the exception that either Beh. 495 or Beh. 496 fills the same explicit requirement, course numbers with an asterisk (*) indicate courses explicitly specified for the B.A. program.

**Beh. 101*: Introduction to Behaviorology I.** Introduction to Behaviorology is a two–course sequence, for both majors and non–majors, on the science of the variables controlling the behavior of humans and other animals. This first course of that sequence introduces the student to the range of components that comprise the discipline of behaviorology including (a) its philosophy of science and selection paradigm, and (b) its experimental methods, theory, and technology. The philosophy and paradigm include the criteria for natural science, the fallacy of inner causes, the significance of control and selection, the status of private events, and the behavior of the scientist. Methods include basic single–subject designs and measurement. Theory includes the fundamental natural laws describing the antecedent and postcedent relations between behavior and its controlling variables; these include such basic principles as added and subtracted reinforcement and punishment, extinction, simple schedules, stimulus control, and establishing operations. Technology includes the basic practices used to apply behaviorological principles to change accessible variables so as to change and especially to expand behavior repertoires through behavioral engineering. Basic techniques include differential reinforcement, shaping, fading, chaining, modeling and imitation, and time out. Other topics include superstitious behavior, emotion, escape and avoidance, and deprivation and satiation. The course includes a laboratory component on the basic principles and methods.

**Beh. 102*: Introduction to Behaviorology II.** Introduction to Behaviorology is a two–course sequence for both majors and non–majors. This second course of that sequence begins by introducing the student to the basic application of behaviorological principles and techniques to the prevention and solution of mild to moderate (non–incapacitating) behavior problems in the most common settings (e.g., child rearing, education, business and industry and organization management). The course includes a laboratory component on applied behaviorology research and methods, starting with the student changing his or her own behavior. The course also introduces analyses of complex behaviors and the variables of which they are a function, such as event–shaped and verbally–mediated behaviors, social behavior, verbal behavior, stimulus equivalence relations, multi–term contingencies, personal control, group control, cultural design, and various controlling agencies (such as in economics, education, government, law, religion). The course also includes analyses of (a) the preference for design rather than accident or chance in the control of both individual...
behavior and, especially, cultural practices, and (b) the
relevance of science to ethics and morality. (Pre: Beh. 101.)

**Beh. 201**: The Behaviorology of Child–Rearing Practices. This course covers, in two parts, the science and
technology of behaviorology applied to the child–care
repertoires of parents. The first part covers some methods
applicable throughout pre–adult years which encourage the
prevention of the common behavior problems of these
years. Some common problems that can be avoided are
associated with bedtime, eating, dressing, shopping, and
automobile travel. Some methods to prevent these prob-
lems include “catch ’em being good,” let kids help, mon-
itor kids, orderly routines, time out, and other forms of
discipline. The second part covers some methods applic-
able to helping distraught parents change problem behav-
iors that have occurred (i.e., “cure” techniques, rather
than prevention techniques). Other topics include toilet
training, language, intelligence, creativity, achievement,
reading, Aircrifs, and morality. (Pre or Co: Beh. 102.)

**Beh. 320**: History and Philosophy of Behaviorology. This course is an in–depth treatment both of the his-
tory of the emergence of behaviorology as a discipline
and of the philosophy of science of this discipline, tracing
the development of the philosophy since the early
twentieth century, comparing and contrasting it with
other philosophies of the times, examining its role in the
emergence of the behaviorology discipline, and consider-
ing its implications for experimental and applied work at
the individual and cultural levels. (Pre or Co: Beh. 102.)

**Beh. 325**: Behaviorology and Culture. This course is a probe of the relevance of behaviorology to cultures and
their survival and improvement (a) by examining such
previously progressive concepts as freedom and dignity and
the current effect of these on the development of more
effective cultural practices, and (b) by examining a range of
scientifically based and improved cultural practices working
in concert and producing a better world as represented in the
behavioral “utopian” literature. The course includes
coverage of the implications, relevant to the present and
future of behavior science and its professionals, the cul-
ture, and the world at large, that are inherent in the later
writings of B.F. Skinner (i.e., *Reflections on Behaviorism
and Society* [1978] and later works). (Pre: Beh. 102.)

**Beh. 335**: Survey of Behaviorology Applications. This course surveys the application of behaviorological
principles and techniques to therapy and clinical behav-
orology with respect to the common and uncommon
solutions for moderate to severe (incapacitating) abnor-
mal behavior problems in common and uncommon set-
tings. The course includes the measurement and
classification of the behaviors it surveys. The course also
includes lab/fieldwork in measurement and applied
methods and research. (Pre: Beh. 201.)

**Beh. 340**: Behaviorology in Education. This course is an examination of the interaction between instruc-
tional design and human behavior in educational
settings from two vantage points: (a) the theoretical, his-
torical, and philosophical aspects of the facts of teaching
and learning, including the reasons for effective and non–
effective methods, the role of technology in teaching, and
the teaching of thinking, motivation, creativity, and dis-
cipline, and (b) the practical aspects of the teaching effort,
including teaching as the management of the learning
environment, the measurement and evaluation of behav-
ior change, the educational techniques of behavior
change, and the expansion of the learner’s behavior rep-
ertoire as a function of teaching. The course includes a
laboratory component in which the student prepares and
tests teaching materials, designs a course, and addresses
the issues of systematic mastery, fluency, and cybernetics
in instructional design. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 345**: Experimental Behaviorology: A Survey. This course surveys complex behavior–environment
relationships including stimulus equivalence classes and
complex schedules of reinforcement, as well as other
complex antecedent and postcedent factors of which
behavior is a function. The course includes a laboratory
component on the complex relationships surveyed.
(Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 350/450**: Behaviorology Research Lab: General. In this course the student will assist in the ongoing work
of two to four current research experiments, in two or
more different laboratories or under two or more different
project researchers in the same laboratory. For each of the
two or more projects, the student will become familiar
with the background experiments and issues of the
project, the current work of the project, and some of the
potential directions of the project. (Pre: Beh. 345.)

**Beh. 355**: Verbal Behavior I. This course is an
introduction to B.F. Skinner’s scientific approach to con-
sidering language as verbal behavior (vb), including cov-
erage of multiple control and the elementary
relationships between the controlling environment and
verbal behavior, plus investigation of the development
and applications of this approach from its appearance,
through evaluative and technological research reported in
the literature, to the present. The course includes not
only an introduction to the book *Verbal Behavior* (Skin-
ner, 1957) but also reviews of the book (the book itself
being more thoroughly covered in a more advanced
course). The course includes a laboratory component on
vb research. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 360/460**: Non–Humans and Verbal Behavior. This course covers the research, controversy, and further
developments in the non–human language field, empha-
sizing the work with sign language and primates as well as
the implications of this research to understanding human verbal behavior. (Pre: Beh. 355.)

**Beh. 365*: Advanced Behaviorology I.** This course is a theoretical analysis of phylogenetic and ontogenic contingencies. Topics related to this analysis include the design of cultures and the environments that produce the designs, the question of purpose in light of the experimental analysis of behavior, the concern with problem solving behavior and the related issues of event-shaped and verbally mediated behavior, the critique of theories alternative to this analysis, the question of whether or not “theories” of learning are necessary, and the problem of freedom and control as it relates to the control of human beings. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 370/470: Advanced Behaviorology II.** In this course the student will learn to evaluate criticisms of behaviorological science. The course includes review of critical commentary, and response to that commentary, such as is available in the “Canonical Papers of B.F. Skinner” issue of The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (7, 4, 1984) and/or other similar sources. (Pre: Beh. 365.)

**Beh. 375/475: Verbal Behavior II.** This course provides comprehensive coverage of all aspects of verbal behavior (vb) as presented in the original work on this topic (i.e., the book, Verbal Behavior, by B.F. Skinner, 1957) and in more recent literature updates. The course includes a laboratory component on vb research. (Pre: Beh. 355.)

**Beh. 380/480: Human Development.** This course is an analysis of the phylogenetic and ontogenic contingencies operating in the subject matter of the field of human development. (Pre: Beh. 355.)

**Beh. 385*: Behavior Technology: A Survey.** This course provides training in two major repertoires that are needed for effectiveness in the work of behavioral engineering: (a) training about the techniques stemming from the laws of behavior that are used to generate, maintain, increase, and decrease behavior in applied settings, and (b) training in the actual use, or application, of these techniques as reported in the research literature. The course includes a lab/fieldwork component in course-related applied research. Pre: Beh. 345.)

**Beh. 390/490: Behavior Technology Fieldwork: General Experience.** In this course the student will assist in ongoing behaviorological engineering work at two to four different field settings such as clinics, schools, and other institutions. Data gathering and paper presentation will be included. (Pre: Beh. 385.)

**Beh. 395*: Teaching Practicum in Behaviorology.** This course introduces the student to the application of scientific teaching methods (e.g., self-paced, systematic mastery and fluency designs, precision teaching, and instructional designs that are cybernetic) while the student practices these methods by assisting comprehensively in the teaching of another behaviorology course (such as Beh. 101 and Beh. 102). May be repeated for credit. (Pre: Beh. 340 plus the course in which the student is to assist.)

**Beh. 440: Seminar: A Survey of the Contributions of Behaviorology.** This course is a seminar on selected materials from relevant sources elaborating on the actual and potential contributions of behaviorology to a wide variety of applied behavioral fields and other disciplines. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 465: Seminar: Current Issues in Behaviorology.** This course considers the major current issues in behaviorology as represented in current and recent issues of the discipline’s journals, and in recent books in the discipline. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 485: Directed Reading in Behaviorology.** This course provides directed reading on discipline-related topics or sources not comprehensively covered in other courses. (Pre: ABC.)

**Beh. 495*: Personal Project or Paper.** This course is a project (with a report), or a paper (with the goal of publication), relating behaviorology to and/or improving, with a behaviorological perspective) the popular cultural view of a topic selected by the student and the faculty member in consultation. (Pre: Beh. 355 plus others that are program specific.)

**Beh. 496*: Professional Paper.** This course is a library and/or field research paper, with the goal of publication, relating behaviorology to the student’s preferred applied behavioral field, including the importance, relevance, and contributions of behaviorology to the selected area. (Pre: Beh. 355 plus others that are program specific.)

### A Selection of Additional Courses

Several additional behaviorology courses are probably more valuable to the advanced student, according to his or her specific career focus. So these courses are more likely to be found in graduate programs. Here, however, course numbers reflect both undergraduate and graduate status in order to show the relation of such courses to the courses already described. The amount of course credit earned will range from one to three, depending on variables inherent in the subjects actually covered. Here is a sample of such courses (an appendix in Ledoux, 1997b, describes the experimental and applied course sequences):

**Beh. 346/446, 347/447, 348/448, 349/449: The Experimental Analysis of [a Selected Topic].** This course is an examination of the background experiments and issues of [the topic], the current work on [the topic], and some of the potential directions of research on [the topic]. (Pre: Beh. 345.)

**Beh. 351/451, 352/452, 353/453, 354/454: Behaviorology Research Lab on [a Selected Topic].** In this course the student will assist in ongoing experimental research on [the topic], including the preparation of reports for
publication. (Pre: Beh. 350/450 and the course on The Experimental Analysis of [the same Topic].)

**Beh. 386/486, 387/487, 388/488, 389/489: Behavior Technology in [a Selected Setting].** This course is an examination of the concerns and issues relevant to technological applications in [the selected setting] and of the prevalent techniques (and their supporting research) that are used in [the selected setting]. (Pre: Beh. 385.)

**Beh. 391/491, 392/492, 393/493, 394/494: Behavior Technology Fieldwork in [a Selected Setting].** In this course the student will assist in ongoing behaviorological engineering work in [the selected setting]. Data gathering and paper presentation will be included. (Pre: Beh. 390/490 and the course on Behavior Technology in [the same Setting].)

**Beh. 430, 431, 432, ..., 439: Seminar on Behaviorology and [a Selected Topic].** This course provides a seminar on [the selected topic] in behaviorology. (Pre: ABC.) [These would be topics not covered in depth in another course. Examples of potential topics include ethics or epistemology.]

**Beh. 441, 442, ..., 445: Seminar: The Contributions of Behaviorology in [a Selected Area].** This course provides a seminar on the contributions, both actual and potential, of behaviorology to [the selected area]. (Pre: Beh. 440.) [The selected area would be one that is not already covered in depth in another offered course. Such areas could involve the impact of behaviorology specifically in a particular human service, human development, or other applied behavioral field.]

### Practical Curricular Development

The interaction of the local circumstances of a particular educational unit with program preferences, such as those inherent in the programs described here, will likely result in curricula well suited for that particular educational institution. Those curricula need not, even should not, mimic the details of the programs described here. These programs were devised without reference to the kinds of conditions that affect curricular design at the local level and which differ from one institution to the next.

Behaviorologists, through TIBA (or TIBI [...Institute]; see the Addendum in Ledoux, 1997b/2002), their professional organization, will build and act on consensus concerning the curricula that produce more and better behaviorologists. Since TIBA will have arranged to certify or accredit training programs, behaviorologists involved in program design and development will presumably consult TIBA for guidance during the process.

### Endnotes

The author thanks Guy Bruce, John Eshleman, Lawrence Fraley, Julie Vargas, an anonymous reviewer, and the participants at the presentation of the presidential address version for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Address correspondence regarding this paper to the author at SUNY–CTC, Canton NY 13617–1096 USA.

### References


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**A Partial & Occasionally Annotated Bibliography to Supplement the References to “Behaviorology Curricula…”**

Presented here is a selection of some of the items in the bibliography in Ledoux, 2002a, that may be particularly usable in some of the courses described in the paper “Behaviorology curricula in higher education”: Ledoux, S.F. (2009). *Behaviorology Today, 12* (1), 16–25.—Ed.


Holland, J.G. & Skinner, B.F. (1961). *The Analysis of Behavior*. New York: McGraw–Hill. (This is the original comprehensively programmed text; the authors successfully applied to its design and use the very laws of behavior that it teaches.)


**A Bit of History**

This was the background for the original TIBA stationary header. It featured the actual name of this natural science—or the most probable approximations of the name—in the five languages of people showing interest in the behaviorology movement soon after TIBA was founded:

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**For the Past or Current Year**

[See the listing in the last issue.—Ed.]
**Syllabus Directory**

Each issue of Behaviorology Today contains three lists. These lists show where to find only the most up-to-date versions (in title and content) of TIBI’s course syllabi. The first list shows syllabi located in the current issue or past issues. The second list shows the schedule (which may change) of syllabi to appear in some future issues. The third list repeats the syllabi locations (actual or planned) but by course number rather than by issue.

**Up–To–Date Syllabi in Current or Past Issues**

Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004): BEHG 101: *Introduction to Behaviorology I.*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004): BEHG 102: *Introduction to Behaviorology II.*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004): BEHG 355: *Verbal Behavior I.*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005): BEHG 400: *Behaviorological Rehabilitation.*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005): BEHG 415: *Basic Autism Intervention Methods.*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005): BEHG 420: *Performance Management and Preventing Workplace Violence.*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005): BEHG 425: *Non–Coercive Classroom Management and Preventing School Violence.*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005): BEHG 475: *Verbal Behavior II.*
Volume 8, Number 2 (Fall 2005): BEHG 410: *Behaviorological Thanatology and Dignified Dying.*
Volume 9, Number 1 (Spring 2006): BEHG 365: *Advanced Behaviorology I.*
Volume 9, Number 2 (Fall 2006): BEHG 470: *Advanced Behaviorology II.*

**Syllabi Planned for Future Issues**

Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??): BEHG 250: *Educational Behaviorology for Education Consumers.*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??): BEHG 340: *Educational Behaviorology for Education Providers.*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??): BEHG 405: *Introduction to Instructional Practices in Educational Behaviorology.*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??): BEHG 455: *Advanced Instructional Practices in Educational Behaviorology.*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??): BEHG 445: *Advanced Experimental Behaviorology.*

**Syllabi Locations Listed by Course Number**

BEHG 101: *Introduction to Behaviorology I:*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004).
BEHG 102: *Introduction to Behaviorology II:*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004).
BEHG 120: *Non–Coercive Companion Animal Behavior Training:*
Volume 10, Number 1 (Spring 2007).
BEHG 201: *Non–Coercive Child Rearing Principles and Practices:*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004).
BEHG 250: *Educational Behaviorology for Education Consumers:*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??)
BEHG 340: *Educational Behaviorology for Education Providers:*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??)
BEHG 355: *Verbal Behavior I:*
Volume 7, Number 2 (Fall 2004).
BEHG 365: *Advanced Behaviorology I:*
Volume 9, Number 1 (Spring 2006).
BEHG 400: *Behaviorological Rehabilitation:*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005).
BEHG 405: *Introduction to Instructional Practices in Educational Behaviorology:*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??)
BEHG 410: *Behaviorological Thanatology and Dignified Dying:*
Volume 8, Number 2 (Fall 2005).
BEHG 415: *Basic Autism Intervention Methods:*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005).
BEHG 420: *Performance Management and Preventing Workplace Violence:*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005).
BEHG 425: *Non–Coercive Classroom Management and Preventing School Violence:*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005).
BEHG 445: *Advanced Experimental Behaviorology:*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??)
BEHG 455: *Advanced Instructional Practices in Educational Behaviorology:*
Volume ?, Number ? (Spring/Fall 20??)
BEHG 470: *Advanced Behaviorology II:*
Volume 9, Number 2 (Fall 2006).
BEHG 475: *Verbal Behavior II:*
Volume 8, Number 1 (Spring 2005).

*An older version appeared in an earlier issue.*
Always More at behaviorology.org

Visit TIBI’s web site (www.behaviorology.org) regularly. We are always adding and updating material.

From the Welcome screen, you can select the Sample page of our Behaviorology Community Resources (designed especially for first-time visitors). This page provides a wide selection of useful articles, many from Behaviorology Today, in Adobe PDF format (with a button to click for a free download of Adobe’s Acrobat Reader software, although most computers already have it). The articles are organized on several topical category pages (e.g., contributions to parenting and education, book reviews, and behaviorology around the world). Other selections on the Sample Community Resources page feature descriptions of TIBI’s certificate programs and course syllabi, and links to some very helpful related web sites.

From the Welcome screen or the Sample Community Resources page, you can also select the main page of the web site, the Complete Behaviorology Community Resources page. This page contains a more complete set of materials, including (a) more articles under the same selection categories as on the Sample page, (b) additional article selection categories (e.g., contributions to autism, natural science, outreach, and verbal behavior) each with its own range of pages and PDF materials, (c) many more links to related behavior science web sites, and (d) several new types of selections (e.g., books and magazines pages and PDFs, and upcoming activities).

Visit the web site regularly. After each new issue of Behaviorology Today, we link the issue’s articles to the relevant selections and categories on the web site.

Explore what interests you. And tell us about your site–visit experience. Your input is welcome, and will help us make further improvements.

As with any category of regular membership or Donor level, a paid online membership (us$5) earns and supports access to the greater amount of online material included on the Complete Behaviorology Community Resources page. (See TIBIA Memberships & Benefits in this issue.)

Subscriptions & Back Issues

People can receive copies of Behaviorology Today in ways other than as a member. People can subscribe without membership for us$20, and people can obtain back issues for us$10 each. Photocopy, fill out, and send in the “membership” form on a later page. As applicable, check the “subscription” box, and/or list which back issues you are ordering. Donations/Contributions are also welcome, and are tax-deductible as TIBI is non-profit (under 501(c)(3)).

While supplies last, new subscriptions—with or without a regular membership—will include a copy of each past issue of Behaviorology Today, beginning with Volume 5, Number 1, (Spring 2002).

TIBIA Memberships & Benefits

The levels of TIBIA membership include increasing amounts of basic benefits. Here are all the membership levels and their associated, basic benefits:

Free—online membership. Online visitors (who may or may not elect to register online as a free member) receive benefits that include these: (a) access to selected, general interest Behaviorology Today articles and links, (b) access to Institute information regarding TIBI Certificates and course syllabi, and (c) access to previews of the benefits of other membership levels.

$5 (to $19) Basic—online membership. Online visitors who pay the $5 online dues earn benefits that include these: All the benefits from the previous membership level plus (a) access to all Behaviorology Today articles and links online, (b) access to TIBIA member contact information online, and (c) access to special organizational activities (e.g., invitations to attend TIBI conferences, conventions, workshops, etc.).

$20 (to $39) Subscription membership. Those who mail in (by regular post) the $20 subscription fee and form receive benefits that include these: All the benefits from the previous levels plus a subscription to the paper–printed issues of Behaviorology Today (issn 1536–6669).

Contribution amounts beyond these first three levels are Donor levels, which are described in TIBI Donors & Levels in this issue. All memberships are per year. The next four membership levels (Student, Affiliate, Associate, and Advocate) were the Institute’s original membership categories, and so are sometimes designated the “regular” membership levels. Here are these regular membership levels and their basic benefits:

$20 Behaviorology Student membership (requires paper membership application co-signed by advisor or department
chair, and dues payment—see TIBIA Membership Criteria & Costs in this issue). Benefits include all those from the previous levels plus these: Access to all organizational activities (e.g., invitations to attend and participate in meetings, conferences, conventions, workshops, etc.).

$40 Affiliate membership (requires paper membership application, and dues payment—see TIBIA Membership Criteria & Costs in this issue). Benefits include all those from the previous levels plus these: Access to advanced levels for those acquiring the additional qualifications that come from pursuing a professional behaviorology track.

$60 Associate membership (requires paper membership application, and dues payment, and is only available to qualifying individuals—see TIBIA Membership Criteria & Costs in this issue). Benefits include all those from the previous levels plus these: TIBIA voting rights.

$80 Advocate membership (requires paper membership application, and dues payment, and is only available to qualifying individuals—see TIBIA Membership Criteria & Costs in this issue). Benefits include all those from the previous levels plus these: May be elected to hold TIBIA or TIB office.

Other Benefits

Beyond the intrinsic value that TIBIA membership bestows by virtue of making the member a contributing part of an organization helping to extend and disseminate the findings and applications of the natural science of behavior for the benefit of humanity, and beyond the benefit of receiving the organization’s publications, TIBIA membership benefits include the following:

- Members will have opportunities to present papers, posters, and demonstrations, etc., at the organization’s meetings;
- Members paying regular dues in the last third of the calendar year will be considered as members through the end of the following calendar year;
- Members paying regular dues in the middle third of the calendar year will be allowed to pay one-half the regular dues for the following calendar year;
- A TIBIA member may request the Institute to evaluate his or her credentials to ascertain which TIBI certificate level most accurately reflects the work (and so, by implication, the repertoire) behind those credentials. The Institute will then grant that certificate to the member; as part of this evaluation, the Institute will also describe what work needs to be accomplished to reach the next certificate level. The normal processing fee for this service (US$20) will be waived for members. For the processing fee of US$20, a non-member may also request this evaluation and, should she or he ever join TIBIA, the US$20 already paid will be applied to the initial membership dues owed. (Faculty teaching behaviorology courses can encourage their students to request this evaluation.)

TIBIA continuously considers additional membership benefits. Future iterations of this column will report all new benefits upon their approval.

TIBIA Membership Criteria & Costs

TIBIA has four categories of regular membership, of which two are non-voting and two are voting. The two non-voting categories are Student and Affiliate. The two voting categories are Associate and Advocate. All new members are admitted provisionally to TIBIA at the appropriate membership level. Advocate members consider each provisional member and then vote on whether to elect each provisional member to the full status of her or his membership level or to accept the provisional member at a different membership level.

Admission to TIBIA in the Student membership category shall remain open to all persons who are undergraduate or graduate students who have not yet attained a doctoral level degree in behaviorology or in an acceptably appropriate area.

Admission to TIBIA in the Affiliate membership category shall remain open to all persons who wish to maintain contact with the organization, receive its publications, and go to its meetings, but who are not students and who may not have attained any graduate degree in behaviorology or in an acceptably appropriate area. On the basis of having earned TIBI Certificates, Affiliate members may nominate themselves, or may be invited by the TIBI Board of Directors or Faculty, to apply for an Associate membership.

Admission to TIBIA in the Associate membership category shall remain open to all persons who are not students, who document a behaviorological repertoire at or above the masters level or who have attained at least a masters level degree in behaviorology or in an acceptably appropriate area, and who maintain the good record—typical of “early-career” professionals—of professional accomplishments of a behaviorological nature that support the integrity of the organized, independent discipline of behaviorology including its organizational manifestations such as TIBI and TIBIA. On the basis either of documenting a behaviorological repertoire at the doctoral level or of completing a doctoral level degree in behaviorology or in an acceptably appropriate area, an Associate member may apply for membership as an Advocate.

Admission to TIBIA in the Advocate membership category shall remain open to all persons who are not stu-
udents, who document a behaviorological repertoire at the doctoral level or who have attained a doctoral level degree in behaviorology or in an acceptably appropriate area, who maintain a good record of professional accomplishments of a behaviorological nature, and who demonstrate a significant history—typical of experienced professionals—of work supporting the integrity of the organized, independent discipline of behaviorology including its organizational manifestations such as TIBI and TIBIA.

For all regular membership levels, prospective members need to complete the membership application form and pay the appropriate annual dues.

Establishing the annual dues structure for the different membership categories takes partially into account, by means of percentages of annual income, the differences in income levels and currency values among the world’s various countries. Thus, the annual dues for each membership (or other) category are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Dues (in US dollars)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Directors member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.6% of annual income, or $120.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.5% of annual income, or $100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.4% of annual income, or $80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.3% of annual income, or $60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliate member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.2% of annual income, or $40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student member</td>
<td>The lesser of 0.1% of annual income, or $20.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Minimums: $20 director or faculty; $10 others

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**TIBIA Membership Application Form**

*(See the next page for the tibi / tibia purposes.)*

*Copy and complete this form (please type or print)—for membership or contributions or subscriptions or back issues—then send it with your check (made payable to TIBIA) to the TIBIA treasurer at this address:

Dr. Stephen Ledoux
TIBIA Treasurer
suny–CTC
34 Cornell Drive
Canton NY 13617 USA

Check if applies:

- Contribution: ☐
- Subscription: ☐
- Back issues:* ☐
  *Vol. ___, #___
  *Vol. ___, #___

Name:

__________________________

Office Address:

__________________________

__________________________

Office Phone #:

Fax #:

E-mail:

Degree/Institution:**

Member Category: ☐

Amount enclosed: US$

Home Address:

__________________________

__________________________

Home Phone #:

CHECK PREFERRED MAILING ADDRESS:

Office: ☐

Home: ☐

Sign & Date:

__________________________

*Subscriptions: US$20/year; back issues: US$10 each.

**For Student Membership:

I verify that the above person is enrolled as a student at:

__________________________

Name & Signature of Advisor or Dept. Chair:
**TIBI / TIBIA Purposes**

TIBI, as a non-profit educational corporation, is dedicated to many concerns. TIBI is dedicated to teaching behaviorology, especially to those who do not have university behaviorology departments or programs available to them; TIBI is a professional organization also dedicated to expanding the behaviorological literature at least through the magazine/newsletter *Behaviorology Today* (originally called *TIBI News Time*) and the *Behaviorology and Radical Behaviorism* journal;** TIBI is a professional organization also dedicated to organizing behaviorological scientists and practitioners into an association (The International Behaviorology Institute Association—TIBIA) so they can engage in coordinated activities that carry out their shared purposes. These activities include (a) encouraging and assisting members to host visiting scholars who are studying behaviorology; (b) enabling TIBI faculty to arrange or provide training for behaviorology students; and (c) providing TIBI certificates to students who successfully complete specified behaviorology curriculum requirements. And TIBI is a professional organization dedicated to representing and developing the philosophical, conceptual, analytical, experimental, and technological components of the separate, independent discipline of behaviorology, the comprehensive natural science discipline of the functional relations between behavior and independent variables including determinants from the environment, both socio-cultural and physical, as well as determinants from the biological history of the species. Therefore, recognizing that behaviorology's principles and contributions are generally relevant to all cultures and species, the purposes of TIBI are:

A. to foster the philosophy of science known as radical behaviorism;
B. to nurture experimental and applied research analyzing the effects of physical, biological, behavioral, and cultural variables on the behavior of organisms, with selection by consequences being an important causal mode relating these variables at the different levels of organization in the life sciences;
C. to extend technological application of behaviorological research results to areas of human concern;
D. to interpret, consistent with scientific foundations, complex behavioral relations;
E. to support methodologies relevant to the scientific analysis, interpretation, and change of both behavior and its relations with other events;
F. to sustain scientific study in diverse specialized areas of behaviorological phenomena;
G. to integrate the concepts, data, and technologies of the discipline's various sub-fields;
H. to develop a verbal community of behaviorologists;
I. to assist programs and departments of behaviorology to teach the philosophical foundations, scientific analyses and methodologies, and technological extensions of the discipline;
J. to promote a scientific “Behavior Literacy” graduation requirement of appropriate content and depth at all levels of educational institutions from kindergarten through university;
K. to encourage the full use of behaviorology as the essential scientific foundation for behavior related work within all fields of human affairs;
L. to cooperate on mutually important concerns with other humanistic and scientific disciplines and technological fields where their members pursue interests overlapping those of behaviorologists; and
M. to communicate to the general public the importance of the behaviorological perspective for the development, well-being, and survival of humankind.

*This statement of the TIBI / TIBIA purposes has been adapted from the TIBI by–laws.
**This journal (BARB) is under development at this time and will appear only when its implementation can be fully and properly supported.—Ed.

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**Periodical Information**

*Behaviorology Today* [known as *TIBI News Time* for the first 4 volumes / 8 issues], is the magazine of The International Behaviorology Institute (a non-profit educational corporation) and is published in the spring and fall each year.

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Send items initially to the editor both by email (or disk) and by hard copy.

Authors’ views need not coincide with official positions of TIBI. (Authors retain copyrights.)
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